

OPERATIONAL RAIDS DURING THE CIVIL WAR: ARE THEY RELEVANT TODAY?

**A MONOGRAPH
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Infantry**



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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

CIVIL WAR RAIDS: ARE THEY RELEVANT TODAY? by MAJ Burdett K. Thompson, USA, 61 pages.

This monograph defines the meaning of the operational raid and demonstrates that raids conducted during the American Civil War were effective methods in achieving limited operational and strategic goals. Current service and joint doctrine and the effects contemporary raid warfare produces are reviewed. Like today, Civil War commanders had to select the most appropriate way to accomplish their mission while considering the forces available, enemy, terrain, and time.

Five 'large scale', high impact raids are analyzed and provide useful historical examples of the operational raids as they existed in the Civil War. The five raids analyzed are the Van Dorn, Forrest, and Grierson raids during the Vicksburg Campaign, Stoneman's raid in support of Hooker's Chancellorsville Campaign, and Sherman's Meridian raid. The raids focus on the operational concerns and considerations facing commanders and illustrate the diverse nature and techniques for conducting raids. They also demonstrate the value of interrupting the enemy's concentration of forces, finding and striking his decisive points, and depriving him of critical support or command and control.

The analysis portion of the study demonstrates that Civil War raids were viable options for accomplishing operational and strategic objectives. The degree of success depended on the commander's ability to apply the factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity. To execute raids today commanders must ensure that forces are properly trained to conduct complex high-risk operations. They must be capable of executing rapid, precise, and bold actions to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. This monograph concludes that raids are viable options for the operational commander to achieve decisive results in the current strategic setting.

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INTRODUCTION

During the Civil War, raids contributed often to an effective strategy. Early in the war the Confederates conceived, planned, and executed operational raids. By the end of 1862 the raid became a routine operation used by the South. As the North increased the size and skills of its cavalry, raids became more common. In addition to deep raids, Civil War cavalry played an important role in screening and conducting strategic pursuits. The Civil War commander had to select the most appropriate way to achieve his purpose while considering the forces available, enemy, terrain, and time. Based on his intent, the commander had a variety of attack options available. The raid was one of these options.

The primary aim of this study is to illustrate that raids, conducted at the operational level of war, are viable missions that can achieve limited operational and strategic goals. Section II defines the meaning of the operational raid. Current service and joint doctrine and the effects contemporary raid warfare produces are reviewed. U.S. military doctrine helps define the concept "raid" as it applies to campaigns and operations. Commanders during the American Civil War faced many of the requirements defined as operational art in FM 100-5 *Operations*. This manual states that operational art requires commanders to have a broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends, and an understanding of the inherent risks associated with any campaign or major operation. Within the overall framework of their campaigns, a variety of ways and means existed for commanders to attack the enemy's center of gravity. FM 100-5 defines center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends. It is that characteristic,

capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”¹

This study analyzes five ‘large scale’, high impact Civil War raids. These include Van Dorn’s and Forrest’s raids during the Vicksburg Campaign, the Grierson raid in support of Grant’s attack on Vicksburg, Stoneman’s raid during the Chancellorsville Campaign, and Sherman’s Meridian raid. Selected raids illustrate the diverse nature and techniques for conducting raids. Although FM 100-5 does not discuss large-scale raids, such as the cavalry raids at Vicksburg and Chancellorsville, they are worthy of analysis because they represent one of the ways for commanders to achieve limited operational and strategic goals.

The factors contributing to the need for raids and implications for their preparation and execution are examined. The five raids, reviewed in detail, focus on the operational concerns and considerations facing the commanders. The factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity are used to analyze the effectiveness of the raids and determine if they met the commander’s intent and achieved strategic goals. The political, psychological, and operational impacts of the raids are also discussed. The study also determines if, in today’s environment, raids are viable options for accomplishing operational and strategic objectives. In doing so, the following objectives are accomplished: review of current U.S. military doctrine concerning raids; analysis of historical raids that may have possible future application; identification of the conditions and challenges commanders may face when executing raids in today’s strategic setting. The final objective is to demonstrate that raids, as a economy of force operation, are effective at striking an enemy center of gravity.

The Operational Raid Defined

With many diverse meanings, the concept “raid” spans from the tactical to the strategic level of war. To establish the groundwork for this study, a precise definition of a raid is necessary. *Joint Pub 1-02*, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and the U.S. Army’s FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, describe a raid as “a type of deliberate attack, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, to confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.”²




Figure 1. Raid.

FM 100-5, *Operations*, describes the raid as one of seven available attack options. The other attack options include the hasty attack, deliberate attack, spoiling attack, counterattack, feint, demonstration, or any combination thereof.³ Raids are “limited-objective attacks into enemy territory for a specific purpose other than gaining and holding terrain. Commanders conduct raids to destroy key enemy installations and facilities, to capture or free prisoners, or to disrupt enemy command and control or support functions.”⁴ If not a stay-behind unit, the raiding force withdraws from the objective area after completing its mission and recovers to friendly lines. The *Operations* manual also states that “raids are a special form of spoiling attack designed to destroy installations or facilities critical to the enemy’s operations. Commanders may also conduct raids prior to or in conjunction with other offensive operations to confuse the enemy or to divert his attention.”⁵

The figure (Figure 1, page 3) graphically depicts an armored force conducting a raid. The force passes into hostile territory to destroy enemy located on Objective EAGLE. Security for the raiding force is provided by a mechanized infantry and armor company securing Objective FALCON and a scout platoon screening the flank of the main effort. The raiding forces have a planned withdrawal route and passage points thru friendly lines.

For the purpose of this study, an operational raid is “a large-scale combined arms operation of relatively short duration designed to achieve an operational objective throughout the depth of a theater of operations or a theater of war.”⁶ The following criteria characterize a raid:

- a raid is designed, planned, and executed under the direction of an operational level commander.

- raids employ all forces that can contribute to the success of the operation regardless of the traditional view of their employment.
- raids require a rapid penetration to the target.
- the raid terminates by a planned or programmed withdrawal.
- a raid is not designed to hold terrain for extended periods, but the force may remain in the objective area for several days.⁷

The definition and criteria above provide the basis for examination of the selected Civil War operational raids.

Historical Raids

History provides many examples of large armies being thwarted in their efforts by a smaller force raiding into their rear area and destroying support systems. The selected raids provide useful historical examples of the operational raid as it existed in the American Civil War. The five Civil War raids analyzed are the Van Dorn, Forrest, and Grierson raids during the Vicksburg Campaign, Stoneman's raid in support of Hooker's Chancellorsville Campaign, and Sherman's Meridian raid. The selected raids illustrate the diverse nature and techniques for conducting raids.

The American Civil War is the first modern war that saw the prolonged and large scale use of two critical strategic and logistic innovations: the railway and the telegraph. These innovations contributed significantly to the development of deep raiding operations with an increased emphasis on attacking communications and logistics.⁸ During the Civil

War, both sides quickly recognized the importance of railroads. The Confederates realized early in the war that damaging rail lines could alter the outcome of a campaign. The “Southern cavalry so effectively exploited the vulnerability of railroads and the dependence of the armies on them that they halted two advances by major Union armies” by conducting raids against their lines of communications.⁹ Destruction of railroads by raids became such an annoying problem for the Federals that they created special construction units solely to repair damaged railroads.¹⁰

An accurate analysis of Civil War raids requires an understanding of the doctrine and role of cavalry during the period. The U.S. military, in the nineteenth century, managed to avoid the European misconception that heavy cavalry still had a role on the battlefield. The unique terrain in America, doctrine supporting a non-traditional cavalry role, and a common sense realization that cavalry could not charge infantry armed with rifles led Americans to develop a cavalry far lighter and more mobile/agile than European counterparts.¹¹

“Throughout the Civil War, cavalry on both sides functioned as mounted infantry, riding to battle but dismounting to fight as infantry.”¹²

“When confronting American infantry, cavalry customarily dismounted to fight. By equipping horsemen with rifles, in addition to pistols and sabers, the Americans had restored to their nineteenth-century cavalry the dismounted defensive power lost when the cavalry gave up the lance. Unlike the lance, soldiers could attach a rifle to their saddle, leaving their hands free for reins and saber or pistol. Strategically, these versatile mounted infantryman readily filled the role of light cavalry.” In addition to reconnaissance and screening, cavalry “proved particularly valuable as raiders.”¹³

Civil War cavalry doctrine “prescribed three major missions: scouting, screening, raids and fighting.”¹⁴ As the traditional ‘eyes’ of the army, a cavalry unit accomplished the primary responsibility to conduct reconnaissance necessary to keep the commander informed of enemy movements, strength and dispositions. Without this information, the army commander remained “virtually blind.” Additionally, cavalry forces could “screen friendly movements” and “deceive the enemy commander about the disposition and location of friendly forces.”¹⁵ The “inherent mobility of cavalry units and their demonstrated capacity for independent operations led to a significant increase in their use as raiders against enemy lines of communication.”¹⁶

The Federal and Confederate cavalry forces organized into troops (or companies), regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps. (See Appendix A)¹⁷ A Federal regiment of about one thousand usually comprised of twelve troops (eighty to one hundred men each) which were organized into battalions as the situation directed. A brigade consisted of four to six regiments. Two or three divisions formed a cavalry corps for a field army. The Confederate organization was similar except that regiments usually consisted of ten smaller companies of sixty to eighty men each. In both armies, two to six regiments formed a brigade, and divisions had up to six brigades (normally two or three brigades). Like their Federal counterparts, Confederate cavalry corps contained two or three divisions.¹⁸

During the early stages of the war, the Confederates had an advantage in cavalry against the smaller, poorly trained and often poorly led Federal detachments. Well organized and efficiently executed large-scale raids by Confederate cavalry began in both theaters in 1862. Confederate success in the initial months of the war resulted largely from the quality

of the cavalry and the leadership's ability to use it.¹⁹ As the war progressed, this early advantage in cavalry held by the South diminished.

To close the gap in both the quantity and quality of the cavalry, General Hooker reorganized the Army of the Potomac to form a cavalry corps of three divisions plus a sizeable contingent of horse artillery. Prior to its reorganization the army had a cavalry division that was primarily used as a courier service, rather than as a supporting arm of the Army. Hooker's consolidation of his cavalry provided the unified command structure and simplified organization necessary for successful large scale strategic operations. The consolidation gave "the Union cavalry, for the first time, an effective structure to deal with the consolidated corps organization of Lee's cavalry."²⁰ The reorganization marked the beginning of the maturation of the Federal cavalry. Other Federal armies adopted this organization. With increased battle experience the Federal cavalry began to improve its performance. "The year 1863 marked a turning point for the Federal cavalry in the Eastern and Western theaters. In both the tactical and strategic employment of cavalry, the Union horsemen proved themselves equal to their opponents."²¹ During the same period, the South began to experience a decline in the quality and quantity of remounts, as well as an inconsistent supply of weapons and accouterments.²² While attrition hit the South relatively harder, the resources of the North permitted its cavalry to catch up and, on occasion, surpass the Confederates.

As the Union cavalry gradually increased its numbers and its skills, it was used by commanders more for raiding rather than for close support of the infantry. During the battle of Chancellorsville, for example, Major General Stoneman had the majority of available

horsemen on a deep raid away from the main battle area.²³ According to historian, James Schaefer, the raid “afforded cavalry the opportunity to be more than just a highly mobile form of infantry.” He described the Union concept: “utilizing the cavalry’s newly consolidated organization and emphasizing the new tactics, the long distance raid allowed mounted troops to disrupt enemy communications and supply lines swiftly and to do sudden, significant damage deep within enemy territory, often without serious loss to the raiding force.”²⁴ This concept clearly established the operational raid as an economy of force mission to gain a certain response from the enemy. “Both Union and Confederate generals realized that although the lack of communications made such raids transitory, they still had spectacular political, psychological, and real operational impact.”²⁵

The Civil War raids summarized below examine several key points. These key points are: the purpose of the raid; conditions and challenges facing the commander in the planning and execution of the raid; and finally, the overall effects achieved. The analysis portion will examine the factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity in determining the overall success of the raids and the accomplishment of operational objectives.

Vicksburg Raids

Some of the earliest uses of operational raids in America emerge from the cavalry raids of the Vicksburg Campaign of 1862-1863. This section summarizes the raids of Confederate Major Generals Earl Van Dorn and Nathan Bedford Forrest on Grant’s supply

lines and Brigadier General Benjamin H. Grierson's raid in support of Grant's second attempt to capture Vicksburg.

In December 1862, Grant made his first attempt to reduce the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg. Grant's intent was to follow the Mississippi Central Railroad south toward Vicksburg hoping to lure the commander of Vicksburg forces, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, out of the city.²⁶ Major General William T. Sherman, commander of the Union XV Army Corps, was to land an expedition at Chickasaw Bayou to attack the city from the north. The significant weakness in the Union plan was the long line of communication stretching from Bolivar, Tennessee, through Holly Springs to Oxford, Mississippi.²⁷ (See Appendix B, Enclosure 1)

The Union forces possessed overwhelming numerical superiority for an attack. If successful, the attack would open the Mississippi River as a Union supply route and geographically split the Confederacy in half. However, the Confederates recognized the opportunity that Grant's actions presented them. They determined that they could affect the outcome of the campaign with a series of audacious strikes. Pemberton authorized an operational level raid in the Union rear for the purpose of destroying Union supplies and the vital Mississippi Central Railroad.²⁸ Pemberton ordered cavalry, lead by Van Dorn, to assemble at Grenada, Mississippi for an expedition against the Federal depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi. This was Grant's primary supply base supporting his Vicksburg operations. The importance of Holly Springs was "readily apparent by the abundant amount of equipment and supplies which were stored there."²⁹

On 20 December, while Van Dorn attacked Grant's leading supply base, Forrest began the destruction of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad approximately seventy miles to the north. The purpose of Forrest's raid was to create a diversion by operating in Grant's rear specifically destroying the railroad linking Grant's army with its main supply depot in Columbus, Kentucky.³⁰ The effect of the raids on Federal lines of communication was far reaching. Historian Ed Bearss characterized the raids as being instrumental in Grant's retrograde. Van Dorn's destruction of Holly Springs, "in conjunction with Forrest's sweep into Western Tennessee, had immediate repercussions on Grant's master plan,"³¹ compelling him to halt his advance.

The termination of Grant's advance had a significant impact on Sherman's expedition to attack Vicksburg from the north. Although Sherman received reports of the Holly Springs disaster on 21 December, he was unaware that the raids had compelled Grant to halt his advance. In the absence of additional orders from Grant, Sherman continued his movement to Vicksburg. He landed on the south bank of the Yazoo River and assaulted Confederate defenses on 29 December. With Grant no longer threatening from the north, Pemberton had time to reinforce his defense north of Vicksburg by moving three brigades from Grenada and middle Tennessee. The Confederate forces repulsed Sherman's attack on Vicksburg. In his summary of the attack, Sherman's report was brief and direct: "I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and failed."³²

These combined raids, striking vital areas in Grant's rear, were a bold concept considering the long distances covered and the synchronization involved. The raids, ordered by a theater commander, deep into the enemy's rear stymied Grant. The raids "cut him off

from all communications with Washington for more than a week, and more than two weeks passed before rations and forage were obtained in sufficient quantity.”³³

In the two weeks that these units operated behind enemy lines, Van Dorn damaged a “prime supply base,” and “Forrest temporarily destroyed the usefulness of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad.”³⁴ In all, Forrest’s raiders had destroyed nearly one million dollars worth of Federal property but, more importantly, they had created the diversion that Bragg had ordered. Van Dorn burned the freight and passenger depots as well as the arsenal, full of weapons and ammunition. Approximately thirty buildings on the public square and 1800 bales of cotton were destroyed. “It was estimated that the government property destroyed amounted to two million dollars, besides the cotton.”³⁵ After destroying the majority of Grant’s supplies, Van Dorn withdrew and “made no effort to consolidate his position or to maintain control of Holly Springs.”³⁶ It was apparent that his mission was one of destruction. The attack on Holly Springs was not a surprise to Grant. He sent a telegraph to the commander of the town, Colonel R.C. Murphy, warning him that he would be attacked. Although reinforcements were dispatched they arrived too late. The Confederates attacked on 20 December and “found Murphy unprepared.”³⁷ Grant’s major supply base was destroyed.

Historians often criticize Civil War raids, as compared with other cavalry missions, for their unproductiveness. Exceptions to the criticism, Van Dorn’s and Forrest’s raids were so effective that they played an important part in influencing Grant to change his campaign plans in early 1863.³⁸ Grant’s force disposition during the move against Vicksburg in the early spring of 1863 indicates the threat posed by raids and the exhausting efforts the Union army made to counter them. Prior to Vicksburg, Grant’s army numbered thirty-six thousand

men and his rear area command consisted of sixty-two thousand men. "Occupying Confederate territory, protecting it from raids like those led by Forrest and Morgan, and covering rail lines absorbed enormous Union resources."³⁹ "The Confederates aware of this potential advantage, continued to dedicate a part of their cavalry to raids that menaced the Union army's line of communication."⁴⁰

In March, having recovered from the dual assault on his supply lines, Grant began planning for his second major operation to capture Vicksburg and deny the Confederates the use of the Mississippi River. Although the two successful raids had saved Vicksburg from capture, they ultimately proved to be disastrous for the South because they provided valuable insight to Grant. In demonstrating the impossibility of maintaining a long overland supply line through hostile territory, the raids convinced Grant to use the Mississippi River instead. He now realized that he could sustain himself off the land and live at the expense of the enemy.

When Federal planners learned that Van Dorn's cavalry had departed Mississippi to reinforce Bragg, they saw an opportunity to strike at Jackson, Mississippi and other segments of Pemberton's supply lines.⁴¹ A bold Union cavalry incursion like Van Dorn's, which thus far only the Confederates had distinguished themselves, was needed.⁴² Grant approved two cavalry raids against the city of Jackson and the Southern Mississippi Railroad to Vicksburg. The cavalry would also strike the Mississippi Central Railroad. The raids sought to divert Confederate forces to the state's interior during the Union army's vulnerable movement across the Mississippi River for the final assault on Vicksburg. The raids were a bold undertaking, yet held great promise of achieving significant results for the Union.⁴³

The first raid was lead by Union Colonel Abel D. Streight. He entered Northern Georgia in early April, 1863. His mission was to cut the Georgia Railroad in Bragg's rear. Although the Union army expected good results from Streight's raid his force was inadequately mounted and effectively pursued by Forrest's cavalry. Streight's force was overtaken on 3 May and forced to surrender. Unlike Grierson, Streight's raid failed to achieve any significant damage.

The second raid began on 17 April, led by Grierson against Pemberton's lines of communication in Mississippi, achieved significant results. Grierson's movements baffled Confederate commanders. "Pemberton soon became aware of the Federal raid, but, confused by contradictory reports generated as the raiders penetrated deeper into the state, he could not determine their primary objective."⁴⁴ (See Appendix B, Enclosure 2) The raid caused intense concern at Confederate headquarters, where Pemberton diverted an infantry division in a frantic and futile attempt to stop Grierson's raiders.

Grierson's raid supported the success of Grant's plan to secure a beachhead on the east side of the Mississippi River. For five critical days, Grierson diverted Pemberton's attention away from the buildup of Union forces on the Louisiana side of the river and the impending amphibious attack.⁴⁵ Pemberton, in a hopeless "effort to destroy Grierson, exhausted a combat-ready infantry division (the strategic reserve). Like the Germans in Normandy, in World War II , Pemberton's strategic reserve arrived at Port Gibson area too late to participate in the battle that decided the fate of Grant's beachhead."⁴⁶

In his official report after the raid, Grierson estimated that his men "wrecked fifty to sixty miles of railroad and telegraph lines, destroyed 3,000 small arms, burned huge quantities

of enemy stores, and captured 1,000 horses and mules. The raiders covered 600 miles in less than sixteen days, losing only twenty-four men."⁴⁷ One of the two railroads Johnston depended on to build up and supply an army at Jackson, for the purpose of lifting the siege of Vicksburg, was put out of operation for over a month.⁴⁸

As the first Federal raid in the West, Grierson's raid was regarded as a sensational success at the time. "The effect of Grierson's raid on Southern morale was considerable." The people of Mississippi were accustomed to seeing Confederate raiders going north, and "were ill-prepared for the Federal thrusts in their territory."⁴⁹ In his *Memoirs*, Grant pronounced the expedition as "one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war" and the Southern press considered the raid an "exceptional undertaking."⁵⁰

The operations discussed above demonstrate the successful use of raids during a campaign to help achieve operational objectives. The three successful raids conducted in the western theater signify the beginning of an increased dependence on the use of cavalry for conducting deep raids during the Civil War. Following is a summary of the Union's first strategic raid attempted in the east, the failure of Stoneman's raid during the Chancellorsville Campaign.

Stoneman's Raid

The Stoneman raid was the first large scale strategic raid attempted by the Federals in the east.⁵¹ In developing the ground plan for the Chancellorsville Campaign, Hooker intended to force Lee out of his positions at Fredericksburg by sending the Union cavalry on

a deep raid to attack Confederate lines of communication and close off avenues of retreat. If successful Hooker would advance with his infantry and trap Lee's army between the infantry and the cavalry. A key to Hooker's plan - the strike directed against Lee's line of communication - was the responsibility of Brigadier General George Stoneman's cavalry.⁵²

Hooker's stated purpose for the raid was to "turn the enemy's position on his left, throwing the cavalry between Lee and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies, checking his retreat, and inflicting on him every possible injury which will tend to his discomfiture and defeat."⁵³ Hooker wanted Stoneman to destroy Lee's line of communication with Richmond and points westward. Stoneman was to accomplish this by "damaging the length of the Virginia Central Railroad as well as portions of the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroads." These lines crossed at Hanover Junction where a depot, thought to be Lee's principal supply base, was located.⁵⁴ After attacking the station, "Stoneman was to select strong positions astride roads paralleling the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroads harass the retreating Rebel troops." According to Hooker's plan, Stoneman would place "unbearable pressure on Lee's rear" while Hooker's infantry attacked into the Confederates from the east and west.⁵⁵

Hooker's initial strategy called for the "cavalry raid to begin two full weeks before the infantry moved out against Lee."⁵⁶ Stoneman was to take all of his cavalry, except one brigade, Colonel Thomas Devin's Second Brigade of the First Division, and horse artillery. Hooker directed the raiding force to cross the Rappahannock at the Rappahannock Bridge, thirty miles upstream from Fredericksburg. Hooker anticipated that Confederate forces would engage the raiders near Culpepper, Virginia, but felt the force was strong enough to

prevail and continue, since intelligence told him that Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of 2,000 men were the only Confederate cavalry in the area.⁵⁷

"From Culpepper the raid would divide into two columns. Brigadier General W.W. Averell would lead his division to Louisa Court House with the purpose of cutting the Virginia Central Railroad, while Stoneman would take the larger part of the corps through Gordonsville to Hanover Junction."⁵⁸ He would then intercept all supplies being sent north and make every effort to prevent Lee from reaching Richmond."⁵⁹ Prior to the raid, Hooker directed Stoneman to "harass the enemy day and night, on the march and in the camp unceasingly. If you cannot cut off from his column large slices, do not fail to take small ones. Let your watchword be fight, and let all your orders be fight. Keep yourself informed of the enemy's whereabouts, and attack him whenever you find him."⁶⁰ The importance of the raid was further emphasized by Hooker's comments that "it devolves upon you ... to make the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army, and on you and your noble command must depend in a great measure the extent and brilliancy of our success."⁶¹ This was a bold plan, a preview of the Union raids conducted later in the war.

Stoneman moved out on 13 April with a force of 10,000 cavalymen. (See Appendix B, Enclosure 3) The force initially made good progress, but failed to cross the Rappahannock for two weeks due to heavy rains. The delay effectively desynchronized Hooker's plan causing him to alter his strategy for the campaign. Since he could not count on the cavalry to get behind Lee in time to force him to retreat from his Fredericksburg lines, Hooker decided to make a broad flanking movement with a large part of his infantry command. The cavalry raid would now be a supporting role with the purpose of disrupting

Lee's communications and diverting some of his strength.⁶²

On 22 April, Hooker sent Stoneman a new set of directives. "These orders provided a radically different agenda than the one outlined in Hooker's 12 April directive." The orders instructed Stoneman to attempt a crossing the following day. The orders said "nothing of seizing Hanover Junction or causing and then blocking a retreat by Lee's army."⁶³ Instead, Hooker suggested that Stoneman "subdivide your command, and let them take different routes . . . these detachments can dash off to the right and left, and inflict a vast deal of mischief, and at the same time bewilder the enemy as to the course and intentions of the main body."⁶⁴ Hooker also ordered Stoneman to move as quickly as possible to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia & Richmond Railroad.

By 28 April, the waters of the Rappahannock receded and the raid continued. Prior to Stoneman's departure Hooker sent him a third directive. The third set of orders more closely resembled those of 12 April. "The primary goal being to gain the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad in Lee's rear."⁶⁵ Stoneman was no longer responsible for compelling the Confederates to abandon the line of the Rappahannock but was to cut off the retreat of the enemy. Stoneman divided his units from the outset of the operation. One detachment, as originally planned, would move against enemy forces presumed to be near Culpepper. The remainder of the force "would make for Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan River and then the Louisa Court House on the Virginia Central Railroad."⁶⁶ The raiding forces would now consist of 7,400 men in six brigades. Three regiments, approximately 1,200 men, considered the least efficient in the Corps, would remain behind.⁶⁷

On 30 April, the cavalry finally crossed the Rappahannock. Ironically, the cavalry did

not lead the way for Hooker's infantry, but actually moved in the rear of the advance wing of infantry. After crossing the river Stoneman split his forces, sending Averell with his division and an attached brigade west towards Culpepper. Averell's command was the first to meet serious Confederate opposition. Averell skirmished with two Confederate cavalry brigades pursuing them to Rappahannock Station where he established a defense rather than continuing to Gordonsville as ordered. As a result of Averell's decision, he effectively neutralized his much larger force. When Hooker learned of Averell's inactivity, he ordered him to return to the main army. Averell's "indecisiveness wasted the services of forty percent of the army's cavalry at the culmination of a critical campaign."⁶⁸ Lee had only two regiments of cavalry, under Fitz Lee, to oppose the large force under Stoneman. The entire rear area of the Confederate army back to the fortifications of Richmond was open to the raiders.

Stoneman continued southward with the remainder of the force. On 3 May, his force reached Thompson's Station. Here Stoneman divided his force into five smaller raiding parties, each with a specific mission. The detachments were not ordered by Stoneman to strike Lee's supply depot at Hanover Junction. According to Stoneman the purpose of dividing up his command was "to cause as much destruction as he could like a shell bursting in every direction and thus magnifying his small force into overwhelming numbers."⁶⁹ By 5 May, three of the five detachments returned to their starting points, the remaining two detachments reentered Union lines by 7 May.

Hooker considered Stoneman's raid a failure. The damage done by the raid was repaired within a few days. In three days the Confederates had the railroad to Fredericksburg

operational. What little success Stoneman achieved was because his forces were largely unopposed. If Stoneman had concentrated his forces, he would have experienced significant accomplishments. Only eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, Guiney Station contained nearly all of the transportation of Lee's army as well as his main supply depots. One-fourth of Stoneman's force could have destroyed the supply depots since they had little or no guard. To have interrupted Lee's communications for any length of time would have imperiled his army or forced him to retreat.⁷⁰

As the commander, Stoneman bears responsibility for mismanaging the raid, but the ultimate responsibility for the strategic failure of the campaign belongs to Hooker. Union cavalry capability was overestimated and resulted in the majority of the cavalry being absent from the immediate battle area. Hooker failed to adjust the cavalry's role to support his revised strategic plan. As a result, he lost his "eyes and ears" making his army vulnerable to flank attacks, which Lee exploited. In final analysis, the raid was a waste of resources, as it removed 7,400 quality troopers from Hooker's control during a critical battle with no significant gain.⁷¹

Meridian Raid

Since the capture of Vicksburg in 1863, few important military movements had occurred in Mississippi, however, in the winter of 1864 Sherman led one of the most significant raids of the year to Meridian, Mississippi. The campaign combined all the elements of Grant's new raiding strategy. "By the middle of January, 1864 . . . Grant

approved a plan for Sherman to advance from Vicksburg with an army of 20,000 men, largely infantry."⁷² The purpose of the operation was to destroy the railroads east and south of Meridian to prevent the possibility of future concentration of a Confederate army on the east bank of the Mississippi. The destruction of these railroads would render it impossible for the enemy to approach the river with artillery and trains.⁷³

The occupation of prominent points in the interior would subject Confederate infantry columns, seeking to gain positions of advantage on the river, to rear attacks. Destroying these railroads would liberate Sherman's army from the necessity of remaining in strength at Vicksburg, or some other point on the Mississippi River.⁷⁴ By neutralizing Confederate communications in Mississippi, Grant and Sherman aimed to make the occupied territory of western Tennessee and the navigation of the Mississippi River more secure. This would hinder the interior lines of communication for any major enemy counteroffensive either north or northwest from Mississippi. The destruction of the railroads would prevent rapid travel and movement of supplies to Mississippi and from the east, making the Union army less vulnerable from Confederate incursions toward the Mississippi River.

The expedition would directly impact Confederate transportation and supplies. Grant stated that the "destruction which Sherman will do to the [rail]roads around Meridian will be of material importance to us in preventing the enemy from drawing supplies from Mississippi and in clearing that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. Sherman's advance, like his July, 1863, march to Jackson, would be a raid. After destroying the railroads and logistical installations around Meridian, he planned to return to Vicksburg."⁷⁵ Sherman possessed great latitude for purposes of planning and execution but had to avoid a pitched battle that

could render his force insufficient to conduct campaigns in the spring.

Concerned that the rebels might use their railroads to concentrate against him, Sherman identified the requirement for diversions. He requested that the Commander of the Gulf, General Nathaniel P. Banks, threaten Mobile by having “boats maneuvering in the Gulf near Mobile a force to keep up the delusion and prevent the enemy from drawing from Mobile a force to strengthen to reinforce Meridian.”⁷⁶ Grant planned for another distraction that would prevent Confederate reinforcements from reaching General Leonidas K. Polk, through Atlanta. Union forces commanded by General George H. Thomas in Tennessee, and those belonging to Major General John A. Logan farther west were to remain active. Grant’s instructions to Thomas were: “to cooperate with Sherman’s movement” and “keep up appearances of preparation for an advance from Chattanooga; it may be necessary, even, to move a column as far as LaFayette.” Logan was also instructed “to keep up a threatened advance on Rome, with a view of retaining on the front as large a force as possible.”⁷⁷

When ready to advance, Sherman moved in coordination with Smith’s cavalry, advancing from Memphis to Meridian. Thomas’s and Logan’s diversions in Tennessee established supporting efforts for Sherman’s two-pronged advance, as well as, the Navy’s distraction in the vicinity of Mobile. In coordination with these movements, “the Eleventh Illinois and a colored regiment, with five tin-clad gun-boats, moved up the Yazoo River to create a diversion and to protect the plantations along the banks of the river.”⁷⁸ Although Sherman relied heavily on diversions as a means of force protection, his main security lay in the offensive dominance of the raid over a persistent defense.

Sherman began his advance on 3 February. (See Appendix B, Enclosure 4) His force

of 21,000 men advanced, sustaining themselves from the land enroute. Sherman's force consisted of Colonel Winslow's cavalry brigade and four divisions of infantry, two each from McPherson and Hurlbut's Corps. The Confederate's initial reaction to the raid directed reinforcements from General Johnston in North Georgia, but they arrived after Sherman reached Meridian. On 14 February, after marching one hundred and fifty miles in eleven days, Sherman's troops "entered Meridian and as Sherman put it, for five days 10,000 men worked hard and with a will in the work of destruction . . . Meridian, with its depots, storehouses, arsenals, hospitals, offices, hotels and cantonments no longer exists." The troops also destroyed approximately one hundred fifteen miles of railroad, sixty-one bridges, and twenty locomotives.⁷⁹

Sherman's operation on exterior lines was a success. The Confederates initially thought that Sherman's objective was Mobile, as a result Confederate troops from North Carolina and Charleston moved to reinforce the city. Although Sherman's actions "caused much anxiety in Washington, Grant felt confident that Sherman could march as fast as his adversaries and, with a choice of withdrawal routes he would find an outlet."⁸⁰ Sherman's inherent security combined with successful diversions, careful planning, and effective coordination, demonstrated the possibility of defeating an alert enemy operating on interior lines. The result was a productive raid.⁸¹

The campaign achieved its logistical objectives. Sherman's forces destroyed over one hundred miles of railroad. His men "lived off the country and made a swath of desolation fifty miles broad across the state of Mississippi." They brought in five hundred prisoners and "about ten miles of Negroes."⁸² Sherman's later march to the sea, beginning in November of

1864, was essentially a large scale replica of the Meridian plan. The Meridian expedition confirmed Grant's logistical raiding strategy and helped solidify his plan for the remainder of 1864 and 1865. "Sherman owed his success to the size of his force, which both supplied ample labor and meant that he did not have to flee when the rebels concentrated a few men against him."⁸³

In summary, the Meridian Raid was a success for the Union. By destroying the railroads between Vicksburg and Meridian, Sherman secured the east bank of the Mississippi River against any future attack by the Confederates, one of the primary objectives of the raid. In conducting the Meridian raid, Grant and Sherman solved the strategic stalemate by "abandoning the persisting strategy of territorial conquest and adopting raiding as the means of carrying out the same basic logistics strategy."⁸⁴ When Grant became commander of the Union army he would rely on lessons learned during the summer of 1864 for the upcoming campaign that would bring an end to the war.

Analysis

This portion of the study uses the factors of objective, surprise, audacity and simplicity to determine the success of the raids summarized in the historical section. A brief description of each factor is followed by an analysis of each raid using the four factors.

Objective

The *Operations* manual, FM 100-5, stresses the importance of directing all military

operations toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. "The linkage, therefore between objectives at all levels of war is crucial; each operation must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. The accomplishment of intermediate goals must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the overall operation. Using the analytical framework of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T), commanders designate physical objectives such as an enemy force, decisive or dominating terrain, a juncture of lines of communication (LOCs), or other vital areas essential to mission accomplishment. Actions that do not contribute to achieving the objective must be avoided."⁸⁵

The Van Dorn and Forrest raids during the Vicksburg campaign illustrate the successful use of objective. Van Dorn and Forrest forced a double calamity upon Grant. Their raids in Mississippi and western Tennessee did not make it possible for Generals Johnston and Bragg to revise their offensive or defensive strategy, but these raids had an important overall effect upon the war in the west at the end of the second year. Equipment and food required by a large advancing army were not available in the quantity needed. Unlike Sherman in Georgia two years later, Grant was not yet ready to subsist off the land compelling him to halt his offensive and to protect his remaining supply bases.

As a result of these attacks further Union penetration of Mississippi was impossible before the spring of 1863. "One of the most important Confederate triumphs of the year" (1862), the victory at Holly Springs "raised the morale of the mounted troops" who were retreating from Grant's relentless drive.⁸⁶ Van Dorn gave the invading Union army one of its most "humiliating if not severest defeats in Mississippi." The raid "helped to prove that cavalry raids behind enemy lines could be effective in combating larger, better-equipped

commands.”⁸⁷ In attacking Grant’s line of communication, Van Dorn and Forrest disrupted Union dispatches to the point where Halleck had to send messages by courier for several miles.⁸⁸

Grierson’s raid during the Vicksburg Campaign also met the criteria of objective. The object of Grierson’s raid was clearly defined, to divert Confederate forces to the state’s interior during Grant’s movement across the Mississippi River for a final assault on Vicksburg. The raid supported Grant’s operational objectives and for five critical days diverted Confederate forces in a hopeless attempt to destroy Grierson. Grant was beginning to appreciate the role operational raids could have in helping to achieve his strategic aims. Describing Grierson’s raid in his *Memoirs*, Grant wrote, the raid “was of great importance for Grierson had attracted the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg”⁸⁹

If Van Dorn, Forrest, and Grierson’s raids are examples of the successful application of objective, then Stoneman’s raid during the Chancellorsville Campaign demonstrates the failure of a commander to direct his operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The Stoneman raid had no strategic impact and little operational or tactical significance on the battle. Hooker did not articulate to Stoneman a unifying concept of operation, and as a commander, he failed to invoke the will to move the force. Hooker sent three different orders to Stoneman prior to his departure. The raid did not have a clearly defined purpose and “lacked zeal in its execution”.⁹⁰

The raid failed either to achieve the turning effect Hooker desired or to cut Lee’s line of communication. Stoneman declined to apply the analytical framework of METT-T. He

could not accomplish the mission assigned with the size force available, and only a vague understanding of the enemy disposition was available. Hooker failed to acknowledge the weaknesses of his newly organized cavalry and its commander. Although Hooker intended for the raid to begin two weeks prior to his main attack, the execution was unsuccessful. Lacking audacity, Stoneman failed to meet the established time line succumbing to the effects of terrain and weather. He did not “employ detachments large enough or working long enough to render more than temporary damage to rail lines, bridges, depots, and canals.” His actions fell far short of the decisive destruction needed to cut Lee’s line of communications.⁹¹ Lee considered Stoneman’s raid as a “mere nuisance and not worth the effort involved in dispatching a large force to quell it.”⁹² He realized that any damage inflicted by Stoneman’s raiders was repairable in a relatively short period of time.

Sherman’s Meridian raid of 1863 is an example of the success achievable when commanders stress the importance of directing military operations toward a clearly defined and decisive objective. Sherman understood the operational and strategic significance of the operation. Grant clearly stated that the purpose of the raid was to destroy the railroads east and south of Meridian, Mississippi to prevent the possibility of future concentration of Confederate forces on the east bank of the Mississippi River. Destroying these railroads would liberate Sherman’s army from the necessity of remaining in strength at Vicksburg, or some other point on the Mississippi River.⁹³ Sherman planned to accomplish his objective by employing “a force of about 20,000 infantry, two divisions from the XVI and XVII Army Corps, plus Colonel Winslow’s brigade of 1, 952 cavalrymen.” The footsoldiers, Sherman wrote, were “to break up the enemy’s railroads at and about Meridian, and to do the enemy as

much damage as possible . . . to result in widening our domain along the Mississippi River, and thereby set the troops hitherto necessary to guard the river free for other military purposes.”⁹⁴

Sherman clearly understood his mission and had an adequate picture of the enemy force disposition in and around Meridian. The accomplishment of intermediate goals contributed directly to the success of the overall operation. Thomas’s preparation for an advance from Chattanooga towards LaFayette and Logan’s threat against Rome supported Grant’s overall deception plan. The diversion of the Eleventh Illinois up the Yazoo River and the Union navy’s activity vicinity of Mobile demonstrate the results possible when military operations have clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. The success of the Meridian raid ultimately contributed to the North’s strategic aim. The raid combined all of the elements of Grant’s proposed raiding strategy. The operation in effect served as a dress rehearsal for future raids and in the end, Sherman’s march to the sea. The raid and others like it prompted Grant, in 1864, to continue employing the raiding strategy. The North sought to overcome its inadequate ratio of force to space. The North faced the almost insurmountable task of subduing a large and hostile country, a task similar to the task the British encountered in the American Revolution. Directing raids against Rebel railroads, factories, and foundries relieved the North’s forces of the need to occupy the entire South.⁹⁵

Surprise

Striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, commanders can achieve success well out of proportion to the amount of effort expended. As Civil War raids

demonstrate, the enemy need not be taken completely by surprise but only become aware too late to react effectively. Civil War raids were unpredictable, using deception, cunning, and guile to gain surprise. 'Factors contributing to surprise include speed, effective intelligence, deception, application of unexpected combat power, operations security, and variations in tactics and methods of operation. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, timing.'⁹⁶ Surprise "delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy command and control, induces psychological shock in enemy soldiers and leaders, and reduces the coherence of the enemy defense."⁹⁷ During the Civil War, "surprise and speed coupled with good horsemanship and daring leaders were indeed key factors for their success."⁹⁸

Van Dorn's raid on Holly Springs also demonstrates that to achieve success the enemy need not be taken completely by surprise, but that he becomes aware too late to react effectively to the raid. The attack on Holly Springs did not surprise Grant. He had telegraphed a warning to the commander informing him of a pending attack. The telegraph dispatch to Colonel Murphy reached him on the evening of 19 December. "He had under his command five or six hundred infantry, besides the Second Illinois Cavalry."⁹⁹ Although he could have resisted the attack until reinforcements arrived, he failed to properly position his forces and prepare the defense. Grant dispatched reinforcements to the depot, but they arrived too late to affect the outcome. Northern troops in the Holly Springs area were left in confusion, and important supplies needed for Grant's Vicksburg assault were destroyed.¹⁰⁰

Adding to the confusion, while Van Dorn prepared to assault Holly Springs, "Forrest attacked, in quick succession, Trenton, Humbolt, and Union City, Tennessee." When Van Dorn attacked Grant's leading supply base on 20 December, "Forrest began the destruction of

the Mobile & Ohio Railroad seventy miles to the north.” As Van Dorn returned to his base, Forrest returned to his base in central Tennessee. In the two weeks the raiders operated behind Union lines, they had caused Grant more concern than during any period of equal length during the winter season.¹⁰¹ Federal reports indicate that Grant’s commanders in northern Mississippi and southern Tennessee never knew the exact location of the two raiders. Surprise successfully delayed enemy reactions, overloaded and confused enemy command and control, and induced psychological shock in Union soldiers and leaders.

Using the factors of vigilance, speed, boldness, and deception, Grierson’s raid achieved significant results. The raid diverted Confederate forces to the state’s interior during the Union army’s vulnerable movement across the Mississippi River for an assault on Vicksburg. The raid delayed Union reactions overloading and confusing Pemberton’s command and control. For five days Grierson successfully diverted Pemberton’s attention away from the buildup of Union forces on the Louisiana side of the river and the impending amphibious assault. Preventing the hasty concentration of outlying Confederate forces against Grant in the early stages of his crossing was critical. Only Grierson himself knew that the true objective was the Southern Railroad east of Jackson, connecting Vicksburg with Meridian and thus with Mobile and the arsenals in Alabama, Georgia, and the east.¹⁰²

“The tactical requisites for the raid included vigilance, speed, boldness, and deception.” Without any of these, his chances of success were in jeopardy.¹⁰³ Grierson’s success was greater than he had any way of knowing. Orders from Pemberton’s headquarters in the Mississippi capital were frantic, directing all available units within possible range to concentrate on the raiding column. “An infantry brigade, en route from Alabama to reinforce

Vicksburg, was halted at Meridian to protect that vital intersection of the Southern Railroad and the Mobile & Ohio, while another brigade moved east from Jackson in the direction of the damaged rail line at Newton Station."¹⁰⁴ The raid achieved the surprise desired. By seeking surprise, Grant achieved success well out of proportion to the amount of effort expended. Assessing the value of the raid said: "it was Grierson who first set the example of what might be done in the interior of the enemy's country without any base from which to draw supplies."¹⁰⁵

During the Stoneman raid, by seeking surprise, Hooker desired to achieve success well out of proportion to the amount of combat power he expended. The Confederates were unaware of the Stoneman raid until movement of the force was actually underway. The Federals used feints and deception to achieve surprise. Messages were allowed to fall into Confederate hands deceiving Lee as to the intent of the raid. Both Lee and Stuart thought that the objective of the Federal cavalry was the Shenandoah Valley. Hooker's attempts at deception and his obsession with operational security resulted in Stoneman being unaware of the overall plan for the Army of the Potomac and how he contributed to the plans success.¹⁰⁶

Stoneman violated two factors that contribute to surprise. First, he failed to maintain the tempo of the operation. His failure to force a crossing of the Rappahannock for nearly two weeks gave up the element of surprise. Despite the attempts to deceive the Confederates by shifting forces and maintaining a presence along an extended front, surprise was lost. Secondly, the Federal army failed in the effective use of intelligence. Nearly all of Lee's transportation and supply depots were at Guiney's station, only eighteen miles from Chancellorsville and well within striking distance of Stoneman's forces. The station had little

or no guard, and could have been destroyed by one-fourth of his force. To have interrupted Lee's lines of communications for any length of time would have imperiled his army or forced him to retreat. The confusion and uncertainty forced on the enemy command post by the presence of a raiding force of unknown size and intentions in the rear are often considerable, but through Lee's comments and reactions it appears that the raid caused him little concern.

Sherman's Meridian raid illustrates the proper use of deception to increase the probability of achieving surprise. The numerous deception operations, the unexpected application of combat power, and the timing and force of the attack gave Sherman a marked advantage. Confused as to the direction of attack and the objective of the main effort, the Confederates thought it was Mobile. Sherman was successful in operating on exterior lines. Confederate reactions were delayed due to confusion and uncertainty. The result was the lack of a coherent defense. Surprise, speed, and the size of the force combined with the audacity of Sherman were key to the success of the Meridian raid.

Audacity

Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive action and especially important in conducting raids. "A simple plan, boldly executed, requires audacious leaders to negate the disadvantages of numerical inferiority. Commanders should understand when and where they must take risks and should not become tentative in the execution of their plan. A challenging situation handled boldly often leads to dramatic success."¹⁰⁷ The employment of forces in the deep battle is a "high-risk undertaking," but when a raid is executed effectively it can have a "disproportionately strong effect on a battle or campaign."¹⁰⁸

The three raids conducted during the Vicksburg Campaign demonstrate the dramatic success achievable through boldly executed plans. The Holly Springs raid and Forrest's successful expedition against the Mobile & Ohio line in Union held portions of Tennessee had decisive effects on the Civil War in the West.¹⁰⁹ The raids deprived Grant of war material and forced the North to halt its overland campaign towards Vicksburg. The Holly Springs attack was a major factor in prolonging the struggle in the west, keeping the Mississippi River in rebel hands until July 1863 and allowing Johnston to continue the build up of forces in Jackson.¹¹⁰

Mobile units can create havoc in the enemy rear. Their speed and unpredictable movements magnify their importance to the enemy and may even distract him completely from other battles or actions. Grierson's cavalry raid of 1863 succeeded in diverting Confederate attention from the movement of Grant's army to the south of Vicksburg. Grierson's raid demonstrates that a simple plan boldly executed by an audacious commander can achieve dramatic success. At the time neither Grierson nor his soldiers realized the significance of the six hundred mile, sixteen day campaign. In fact, "one Southerner who had met the Yankees in the course of their travels through Mississippi had admitted, with unconcealed admiration: you are doing the boldest thing ever done."¹¹¹

The first large scale raid attempted in the east by the Federal army failed. Timid in the execution of the plan, Stoneman did not understand when and where he should take risk. Hooker's intent during Chancellorsville was to force Lee out of his positions at Fredericksburg by sending the Union cavalry on a deep raid to attack Confederate lines of communications and block avenues of retreat. If the raid was successful Hooker would advance with his infantry and trap Lee between the infantry and cavalry forcing his defeat. Hooker wanted Stoneman to

“harass the enemy day and night” attacking the enemy when and wherever he found him. Hooker further emphasized the importance of the raid and the need for audacity in its execution by stating that if Stoneman could not “cut off large slices from the enemy column, then not to fail at taking small ones.” He was instructed that his “watchword be fight, and all his orders be fight.”¹¹² Hooker’s initial instructions to Stoneman required an audacious commander.

When faced with challenging situations and command decisions during the raid Stoneman failed to act boldly. As a result of Stoneman’s indecisiveness the damage done by the raid was repaired within a few days. The activities of the Federal cavalry made little impression on Lee and the Confederate army and had no direct effect on the Battle of Chancellorsville. Lee virtually ignored Stoneman’s maneuvering in his rear and avoided making the same mistakes as Hooker by not allowing his own depleted cavalry to pursue the Federal cavalry.¹¹³ The raid proved to be a waste of resources, as it removed 7,400 quality troopers from Hooker’s control during the critical battle with no significant gain.¹¹⁴

In contrast to the Union raid in the east, Sherman’s Meridian raid achieved success. The raid was audacious relying on deception and providing Sherman with a choice of withdrawal routes to select from to reduced the risk to his force. “Sherman’s intrinsic security together with effective distraction[s] demonstrated the possibility . . . with careful planning, and effective coordination, of defeating an alert enemy who possessed interior lines.”¹¹⁵

Simplicity

The final factor that determines the success of raids is simplicity. In *On War*, Carl von

Clausewitz states that everything in war is very simple, but the simple things are difficult. This statement highlights the importance of commanders preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. "Simplicity contributes to successful military operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity is especially valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired. Simplicity in plans allows for better understanding and troop leading at all echelons and permits branches and sequels to be more easily understood and executed."¹¹⁶

Pemberton authorized the Van Dorn raid with a clear purpose of destroying Union supplies and disrupting the vital Mississippi Central Railroad. Forrest's instructions were also simple; he was to create a diversion by operating in Grant's rear. His specific mission was to destroy the railroad linking Grant's army with its main supply depot in Columbus, Kentucky. Van Dorn and Forrest clearly understood their orders. As a result, both raids were a success and played an important part in influencing Grant to halt his plans to attack Vicksburg.

In April 1863, Grant authorized two raids to target the city of Jackson and the Southern Mississippi Railroad. Grierson was to divert Confederate forces attention to the state's interior during the Union army's movement across the Mississippi River to assault Vicksburg. Grierson's raid demonstrates how simple orders, boldly executed, contribute to successful military operations. Grierson issued uncomplicated plans to his subordinates. His force diverted Pemberton's attention for five critical days, while covering 600 miles in less than sixteen days and losing only twenty-four men.

The first large scale raid conducted in the east by the Union army failed to achieve the

decisive results that Grierson realized in Mississippi. Hooker violated the concept of simplicity when issuing his orders to Stoneman. His initial orders stated that the purpose of the raid was to turn the enemy's left by placing the cavalry between Lee and Richmond, isolating him from his supplies and preventing his retreat. Hooker altered the plan twice prior to the departure of the raiding force. Stoneman misunderstood his orders resulting in the ineffective use of a significant portion of Hooker's cavalry. Simplicity in the initial order may have allowed for a better understanding of the plan at all echelons.

The largest raid thus far in the war was led by Sherman against Meridian, Mississippi, with the purpose of destroying railroads east and south of Meridian. This raid would prevent the possibility of future concentrations of a Confederate army on the east bank of the Mississippi River. Starting in the Autumn of 1863, Grant and Sherman began planning a large raid deep into Mississippi. The plan entailed two coordinated attacks into Mississippi. Sherman employed several diversions to draw Confederate attention from the main attack and provide force protection. As a result of careful planning, effective coordination, and clearly stated objectives, the raid was a success for the Union, destroying the railroad east and south of Meridian and prevented Confederate troop concentrations on the east bank of the Mississippi River.

The raids discussed in this section highlight the importance of commanders preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders at all echelons. The Van Dorn, Grierson, and Sherman raids demonstrate that the principle of simplicity and its contributions to successful military operations.

As an offensive strategy, raids succeeded when the factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity were applied. Both Van Dorn's and Forrest's raids had clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. They avoided the main forces of the enemy. Despite some initial bungling the Federal cavalry had made important contributions to Union arms. Most notable were the successful raids conducted by Grierson during the Vicksburg Campaign and Sherman during the Meridian raid. "Grierson's horsemen proved the effectiveness of a hard riding strike behind enemy lines"¹¹⁷ while Sherman's raid provided a glimpse of the raiding strategy the North would eventually adopt to destroy the resources which would have enabled the South to continue the struggle.

As the historical section of the study illustrates, raids are a valuable means to conduct deep attacks at the operational level. They can assist greatly in the defeat of an enemy force. As the Stoneman raid illustrates, there are inherent risks and limitations associated with all raids. Because they operate separately from the main forces, raids, depending on their size, disperse combat power. This dispersion of combat power weakens the force fighting the close battle, making it more susceptible to enemy counter-action. As a result of Hooker's decision to send the majority of his cavalry on a raid during the Chancellorsville Campaign, they were unavailable during the critical point in the battle; Lee exploited this weakness. The Stoneman raid also demonstrates the importance of a commander establishing a clearly defined, obtainable objective, and issuing clear and concise orders. Hooker's inability to provide clear and concise orders, and his gross overestimation of his cavalry's capabilities, resulted in a raid that did not accomplish its tactical, operational or strategic objectives. Stoneman's raid failed for the Union army.

As the raids demonstrate there was a limit to how deep the raiding forces could penetrate. Natural obstacles often affected the outcome of the raids. Enemy action can also inhibit the raid by destroying the force or by cutting the raiders off from their base of supply or potential withdrawal routes. Pemberton desperately tried to capture Grierson during his raid through Mississippi. The Confederates made a futile attempt to cut off all potential withdrawal routes, however Grierson's moves were rapid and unpredictable enabling him to avoid the Confederate troops.

"Finally, raids are limited in the amount of destructive capability they can take with them. Without the ability to destroy the target, the effect of a raid may be less than optimal."¹¹⁸ Stoneman's raid demonstrates that without a clearly defined objective even a large raiding force can fail to have an effect on an enemy course of action. Sherman's Meridian raid, however, was an attempt to overcome this problem by employing larger forces consisting of infantry, artillery, and engineers. The larger force allowed for a greater degree of destruction without the fear of being forced to withdraw because of a lack of combat power.

The five 'large scale', high impact raids of Van Dorn and Forrest, Grierson, Stoneman and Sherman illustrate the diverse nature and techniques for conducting raids. As the analysis portion of this study demonstrates, Civil War raids were viable options for accomplishing operational and strategic objectives. The degree of success depended on the commander's ability to apply the factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity. Considered during the Van Dorn, Forrest, Grierson, and Sherman raids, these four factors resulted in tactical missions that had operational and strategic impacts. Stoneman's raid during the Chancellorsville Campaign, however, provides a historical example of the lack of operational

impact resulting from a commander's failure to properly apply the four factors. Although "the risks involved in employing maneuver forces in the enemy's rear is obvious, the potential for success is so great that such operations will be justified in many instances."¹¹⁹

The Future of Raids

"America's army has its eyes focused on the 21st century - while its boots are firmly planted in the realities of today's world."¹²⁰ The Army is working hard to develop and field equipment and systems envisioned by *Joint Vision 2010* and the *Army After Next* project. Advances in technology will have enormous impacts on military forces, equipment and specific capabilities, such as the raid. The Army must maximize the capabilities of new technological systems. Failure to adapt these technologies to our operations could greatly increase the risks facing our forces. The current doctrine, organization, training, material, and leader development practices must be enhanced to enable the Army to exploit and win on the 21st century battlefield.

Doctrine. This study identified the inconsistencies in service and joint doctrine in defining the concept of operational raids. The definitions found in current doctrinal manuals are different and primarily focused at the tactical level. Additional attention on terminology is needed to ensure a common understanding of the raid in service and joint doctrine. Raid doctrine must be expanded to consider the joint and combined arms aspect at the operational and strategic level of war. "The expansion must reach beyond maneuver doctrine to include its supporting array of Mission Training Plans (MTPs), lower echelon tactical doctrine, and appropriate Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)."¹²¹ As we change the way we fight,

doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for raids at the combined and joint level.

Organization. “Not withstanding the effects of force reductions, the Army has . . . only a limited capability to conduct operational raids with conventional forces.”¹²² A heavy force equipped with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, for example, would be hard pressed to operate behind enemy lines for periods exceeding twelve to fifteen hours, primarily because of fuel and munitions resupply. The force could penetrate enemy lines and operate in the rear, but would be unable to escape the tactical depth of the battlefield. “If a large self-contained force was committed on an operational raid, such as a brigade or an armored cavalry regiment, there would be significant challenges while conducting sustainment operations.”¹²³ Clearly a solution to the logistics sustainment challenge is necessary. If conditions warrant, instead of conventional heavy forces a light/heavy mixture of forces can be employed. When provided with the proper assets for insertion, these forces can conduct deep penetration raids. Exfiltration from such raids is difficult and is a force limiting factor that must be considered.¹²⁴

Alternatives other than conventional heavy forces include unconventional forces. Due to their capabilities unconventional forces are uniquely adaptive to conduct operational raids. Special Operations Forces operations are characterized by the use of small units in direct or indirect actions focused on strategic and operational objectives. Forces such as rangers, special forces, light infantry, airborne, or air assault may operate independently alone or in concert with other special operations forces. Special Operations Forces are capable of direct action operations, penetrating deep behind enemy lines to conduct precision strikes to destroy

key enemy installations and facilities, to capture or free prisoners, or disrupt enemy command and control and support functions.¹²⁵

Training. Training is the weakest aspect of the Army's present raid capability. The longstanding shortfall of training for operational and strategic raids will take significant time and effort to overcome. Instructional expertise at all levels will require increased emphasis. Our educational and training programs must focus on preparing joint warriors to meet the future battlefield challenges, such as the raid. The requirement for high quality, realistic and stressful training that amplifies education and fully prepares our forces to execute raid strategies at the joint level is similarly important. Our training must reflect emerging threats and utilize emerging technology to meet these threats.

Material. The technological enhancements the Army is implementing will continue into the future. Developments in precision engagement will enhance raid operations and enable our forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control for raiding forces, assess levels of success, and retain flexibility to reengage when and if required. Additionally, global positioning systems, and enhanced standoff capabilities will provide increased accuracy and a wider range of attack options.¹²⁶ These capabilities will increase the combat power available for use against selected objectives, resulting in enhanced economy of force. The current efforts to increase the lethality, information capability, and tactical mobility will significantly enhance the execution of raid operations.

Leadership. The Army must improve its current leader development program to prepare leaders for their roles in the Army's 21st century force. The capability of raids must emphasize both officer and noncommissioned officer training and education curriculums.

Leaders must also be able to assess rapidly their mission in light of their current capabilities and those of the enemy.¹²⁷ Officer basic and advanced courses, the Command and General Staff College, Pre-Command Courses, and Senior Service Colleges must ensure their curriculum includes and emphasizes raid operations. This is especially true for the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies where officers receive formal tactical and operational education prior to assuming key roles as planners, operations officers, and commanders. We cannot expect risk free, push button style operations in the future. Military operations, to include the raid, will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions.

Conclusion

This monograph defines the meaning of the operational raid and demonstrates that raids conducted during the American Civil War were effective methods in achieving limited operational and strategic goals. The Civil War provides many historical examples of operational raids for study and application. Like today, Civil War commanders had to select the most appropriate way to achieve their mission while considering the forces available, enemy, terrain, and time. Based on his intent, the commander could select a variety of attack options. The raid was one of these options. The raids, discussed in the Historical and Analysis sections added a significant dimension to the conduct of war. They demonstrated the value of interrupting the enemy's concentration of forces, finding and striking his decisive points, and



depriving him of critical support or command and control. Raids proved one of the Civil Wars most effective operations.¹²⁸

The challenge facing the U.S. Army, at the turn of the century, is to identify the conditions and possibilities that allow for successful raids. As this study has emphasized successful raids today are characterized by the following:¹²⁹

- selection of a start time and location not known by the enemy.
- planning, rehearsal, and deployments that are undetected.
- execution of swift, violent, precise, and audacious actions that focus full combat power at the decisive time and place.
- use of all available combat power assets.
- time operations precisely.
- disengage swiftly when mission is complete.
- employ deception to support mission plan.

U.S. armed forces possess the means to conduct operational raids to achieve limited strategic objectives. To execute raids, in the current strategic environment, commanders must ensure that forces are properly trained to conduct complex and high-risk raid operations. They must be capable of executing rapid, precise, and bold actions to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Operational raids aimed at achieving decisive results must ensure that the factors of objective, surprise, audacity, and simplicity are considered. Employing forces to conduct raids in the enemy's rear has both obvious risks and significant potential. In war, however, victory is never easy or without risk, for only " . . . by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy."¹³⁰

APPENDIX A



APPENDIX B
Maps of Civil War Raids

Enclosures:


Map 1. Van Dorn's Raid on Holly Springs

Map 2. Grierson's Raid

Map 3. Stoneman's Raid


Map 4. Sherman's Planned Raid

Map 1. Van Dorn's Raid on Holly Springs. From Robert G. Hartje. *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General*, (Ohio: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), p. 259.




VAN DORN'S RAID ON HOLLY SPRINGS


Map 2. Grierson's Raid. From Jerry Korn. *War on the Mississippi: Grant's Vicksburg Campaign*, (Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc., 1985), p. 90.



Map 3. Stoneman's Raid. From Edward J. Stackpole. *Chancellorsville: Lee's Greatest Battle*, (Pennsylvania: The Telegraph Press, 1958), Map No. 5.



Map 4. Sherman's Planned Raid. From Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones. *How the North Won*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 508.



Sherman's Planned Raid

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: June 1993), p. 6-7.

²U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 101-5-1 (Final Draft), Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: 1995), p. 1-223.

³*FM 100-5*, pp. 7-5 thru 7-8.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 7-8.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 7-1.

⁶Harry E. Mornston, *Raids at the Operational Level - To What End?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1992), p. 8.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁸Christopher Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 67.

⁹Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 416.

¹⁰James A. Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War* (Ohio: University of Toledo, 1992), p. 224.

¹¹Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, p. 416.

¹²Richard E. Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1986), p. 247.

¹³Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, p. 416.

¹⁴Jerry D. Morelock, "Ride to the River of Death: Cavalry Operations in the Chickamauga Campaign" *Military Review*, (October 1984), p. 4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 4, 6.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Richard E. Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, p. 247.

²⁰Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 92.

²¹Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War*, p. 222.

²²Samuel Carter III, *The Last Cavaliers: Confederate and Union Cavalry in the Civil War* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1979), p. 11.

²³Paddy Griffith, *Battle Tactics of the Civil War* (United Kingdom: The Crowood Press, 1987), p. 183.

²⁴Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War*, pp. 196-197.

²⁵Bellamy, *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p. 67.

²⁶Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War*, p. 203.

²⁷Ibid., p. 204.

²⁸Thomas E. Griess, *The American Civil War* (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987), pp. 73.

²⁹Robert G. Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General* (Ohio: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), p. 256.

³⁰Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 205.

³¹Edwin C. Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Vicksburg is the Key*, Volume I (Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1986), p. 321.

³²Thomas E. Griess, *The American Civil War* (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1987), pp. 73-74.

³³Thomas F. Thiele, *The Evolution of Cavalry in the American Civil War: 1861-1863* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1951), p. 366.

³⁴Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General* (Ohio: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), p. 268.

³⁵Alfred H. Guernesy and Henry M. Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1866), p. 318.

³⁶Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General*, p. 264.

³⁷Guernesy and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 318.

³⁸Griess, *The American Civil War*, p. 94.

³⁹Beringer, Hattaway, Jones, and Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, p. 249.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁴¹Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 212-213.

⁴²Guernesy and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 455.

⁴³Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 213.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁴⁵Edwin C. Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Grant Strikes the Fatal Blow*, Volume II (Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1986), p. 236.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 236.

⁴⁷Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 215. Grierson's losses were three men killed, seven wounded, five left behind sick, and nine missing.

⁴⁸Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare*, p. 201.

⁴⁹Thomas F. Thiele, *The Evolution of Cavalry in the American Civil War: 1861-1863* (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1951), p. 459.

⁵⁰Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 215, quoted in Alexander D. Brown, *Grierson's Raid* (Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1981), p. 222.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁵²Edward G. Longacre, *Mounted Raids of the Civil War* (New Jersey: A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 152.

⁵³Edward J. Stackpole, *Chancellorsville: Lee's Greatest Battle* (Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1958), p. 104.

⁵⁴Longacre, *Mounted Raids of the Civil War*, p. 152.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁵⁶David G. Martin, *The Chancellorsville Campaign* (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, Inc., 1991), p. 71.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 71, 75.

⁶⁰Guernesy and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 486.

⁶¹Gary W. Gallagher, ed., *Chancellorsville: The Battle and Its Aftermath* (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 68.

⁶²Martin, *The Chancellorsville Campaign*, p. 76.

⁶³Gallagher, *Chancellorsville: The Battle and Its Aftermath*, p. 69-70.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 70. Hooker's instructions to Stoneman stated that "he may subdivide his force, but if he does, he must have the several parts come together at some point in the enemy's country which he is to designate." For more details on Stoneman's instructions see Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville*, p. 163.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁶*Ibid.*

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Martin, *The Chancellorsville Campaign*, p. 77.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 78. Also discussed in Gallagher, *Chancellorsville: The Battle and Its Aftermath*, p. 99.

⁷⁰Guernesey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 500.

⁷¹Martin, *The Chancellorsville Campaign*, p. 84.

⁷²Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones. *How the North Won*. (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 506.

⁷³Guernesey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 569.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 569.

⁷⁵Hattaway and Jones. *How the North Won*, pp. 506-507.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 507.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Guernesey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 569.

⁷⁹Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, p. 509.

⁸⁰Archer Jones, *Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 186.

⁸¹Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, p. 509.

⁸²Jones, *Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat*, p. 186.

⁸³Ibid., p. 186.

⁸⁴Ibid. For a detailed account of the Fourth Iowa Volunteer Cavalry's actions during the Meridian Campaign see William F. Scott, *The Story of a Cavalry Regiment* (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1893), pp. 184-214.

⁸⁵*FM 100-5*, p. 2-4.

- ⁸⁶Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General*, pp. 268-9.
- ⁸⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 267-8.
- ⁸⁸Thiele, *The Evolution of Cavalry in the American Civil War: 1861-1863*, p. 363.
- ⁸⁹Bearss, *The Campaign for Vicksburg: Grant Strikes the Fatal Blow*, p. 236.
- ⁹⁰Schaefer, *The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the Civil War*, p. 209.
- ⁹¹Longacre, *Mounted Raids of the Civil War*, p. 172.
- ⁹²*Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.
- ⁹³Guernesey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 569.
- ⁹⁴Stephen Z. Starr, *The Union Cavalry in the Civil War* (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), p. 377.
- ⁹⁵Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, p. 418.
- ⁹⁶*FM 100-5*, p. 2-5.
- ⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7-1.
- ⁹⁸Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General*, pp. 267-8.
- ⁹⁹Guernesey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 318.
- ¹⁰⁰Hartje, *Van Dorn: The Life and Times of a Confederate General*, pp. 265.
- ¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, pp. 268.
- ¹⁰²Shelby Foote, *The Beleaguered City: The Vicksburg Campaign December 1862-July 1863* (New York: The Modern Library, 1995), p. 133.
- ¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p. 139.
- ¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 145-146.

- ¹⁰⁶Stackpole, *Chancellorsville: Lee's Greatest Battle*, p. 109.
- ¹⁰⁷FM 100-5, p. 7-3.
- ¹⁰⁸L.D. Holder, "Maneuver in the Deep Battle" *Parameters*, (May 1982), p. 60.
- ¹⁰⁹Longacre, *Mounted Raids of the Civil War*, p. 64.
- ¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 64.
- ¹¹¹Ibid., p. 121.
- ¹¹²Guernsey and Alden, *Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War*, p. 486.
- ¹¹³Stackpole, *Chancellorsville: Lee's Greatest Battle*, p. 110.
- ¹¹⁴Martin, *The Chancellorsville Campaign*, p. 84.
- ¹¹⁵Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, p. 509.
- ¹¹⁶FM 100-5, p. 2-6.
- ¹¹⁷James P. Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg: Wilson's Raid Through Alabama and Georgia* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1987), p. 8.
- ¹¹⁸Lawrence W. Moores, *The Mounted Raid: An Overlooked Deep Operations Capability* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, June 1990), p. 11.
- ¹¹⁹Holder, "Maneuver in the Deep Battle", p. 56.
- ¹²⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Focus 94: Force XXI*, (Washington, DC: 1994), p. 1.
- ¹²¹James L. Boling, *Tactical Exploitation: Neglected Imperative of Modern Combat* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, December 1996), p. 36.
- ¹²²Paul C. Jussel, *Operational Raids: Cavalry in the Vicksburg Campaign, 1862-1863* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, June 1990), p. 66.
- ¹²³Ibid., p. 66.
- ¹²⁴U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 7-98 Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: 1992), p. 5-9.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 59.

¹²⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1997), p. 11.

¹²⁷Moore, *The Mounted Raid: An Overlooked Deep Operations Capability*, pp. 43-4.

¹²⁸Holder, "Maneuver in the Deep Battle", pp. 56-7.

¹²⁹U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 7-98 Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. 5-9.

¹³⁰Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 596.

¹³¹Morelock, "Ride to the River of Death: Cavalry Operations in the Chickamauga Campaign", p. 5.

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